Benefits for Croatia

The fact that it was launched by presidents fixed the Three Seas Initiative within political circles, which in turn led to suspicion and disinterest from certain prime ministerial circles, and even a sense of competitive threat. Croatia is now an exception to that rule—after the new president Zoran Milanović refused in 2020 to take over Croatia’s 3SI role from his predecessor (declining to recognize the strategic potential of the initiative and its concrete benefits for Croatia, convinced that it was mainly an attempt by an American think tank to promote figures on the right wing of the European political spectrum), Prime Minister Andrej Plenković took over participation in 3SI.

Croatia is now one of the rare countries managing its 3SI commitments through the Government instead of the President’s Office—which, considering the financing and implementation of projects, is a better solution with significantly greater operational potential. Other member states are now considering doing the same. Put simply, successful realization of 3SI depends on cooperation at the government level of participating countries.

Currently, all 3SI member states are EU countries, but the actual circle of participants is much broader. Strategic partners of 3SI include the USA, Germany, Japan, and the European Commission, with Spain and Turkey joining after the recent summit in Warsaw. Ukraine and Moldova, as well as Montenegro and Albania, are associate participants.

This broad network shows that interest in 3SI is much greater than initially planned. The participation of the U.S. Secretary of Energy (i.e., minister) Chris Wright at the Warsaw summit is clear proof that interest and support from the U.S. has not diminished—even under the Donald Trump administration.

While U.S. involvement is expected and logical (especially from a transatlantic and potentially lucrative project perspective), Japan’s strategic partnership may seem puzzling at first. But when considering China’s push into Europe via the Belt and Road Initiative (launched in 2013), Japan’s interest in joining a similarly structured initiative without Chinese involvement becomes strategically clear.

The embryonic nucleus of the 3SI can be found in a document drafted in 2014 by the Atlantic Council, titled “Completing Europe – From the North-South Corridor to Energy, Transport, and Telecommunications Union.”

In it, the importance of accelerating the construction of an energy, transport, and communication corridor along the North-South axis—from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Seas—was highlighted. These remain the core pillars of 3SI, with key terms such as economic security, resilience, connectivity, innovation, and investment. From a practical perspective, one of the strongest arguments in favor of 3SI is the fact that road and rail transport in this region is two to four times slower than in Western Europe.

Heavy Congestion

When 3SI was founded, dark clouds were already looming over Ukraine (Russia had occupied Crimea), but a major war still seemed distant, and few could have fully predicted how devastating its scale and consequences would be. Russian aggression against Ukraine has added a new context to 3SI: all three main areas the Initiative focuses on—transportation, energy, and digital—can now serve dual purposes in this part of Europe: both civilian and military.

This is reflected in the Joint Declaration adopted at the recent summit in Warsaw, which states that 3SI members “support further efforts to strengthen transportation structures that serve civilian purposes while also enhancing strategic military mobility in our region.” The value of 3SI is potentially immense not only in this military-security context but also in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine (which will be measured in billions of euros).

The first initiative for multilateral political and interest-based cooperation in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe predates 3SI. The Central European Initiative (CEI)—known in Croatia as SEI—was founded back in 1989. Today, the CEI includes 17 states and remains the only initiative of its kind that spans not only some EU member states (including Croatia) and the Western Balkan countries (excluding Kosovo), but also Belarus. With its permanent secretariat in Trieste, the best days of the CEI are largely behind it. While it played an important role in post-Cold War European democratization and integration, that role has largely been exhausted, and the CEI is struggling to find a future purpose—though this does not mean it will disappear.

A similar story applies to the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative, launched in 2000 as a political project by then Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema and Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini (helped by the fact that a fellow Italian, Romano Prodi, was then President of the European Commission). The Initiative was established in Ancona, where its secretariat remains today, at a ministerial meeting remembered in Croatian diplomatic history as the only one attended by a Croatian Foreign Minister traveling officially by ship (Tonino Picula, via the Split–Ancona ferry line). The initiative now includes nine countries: the original members—Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Greece—later joined by Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia.

Focused on the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, with an emphasis on regional cooperation in ecological projects and coastal city engagement, the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative also faces a major challenge: how to remain relevant and avoid duplicating the work of other initiatives and multilateral projects.

It can rightly be said that the Three Seas Initiative has entered a saturated space in which there was already plenty of crowding even without it. Strategically and geopolitically, however, current circumstances in this part of Europe favor the growing relevance of 3SI—so much so that, had it not already existed, it would be worth creating today. The importance of cross-border cooperation in infrastructure projects—which carry long-term geopolitical implications—only reinforces 3SI’s future potential. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to state that 3SI is more suited to today’s reality than the time in which it was launched. Unlike many other initiatives, the Three Seas Initiative is becoming more relevant with each passing year.

The Krk Terminal

Differences of opinion within 3SI—while theoretically contributing to creativity—often manifest as political headaches. This was evident at the recent Warsaw summit, where Hungary did not sign the Joint Declaration, which included a strong condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Instead, Hungary released a unilateral statement, expressing support for 3SI’s goals but distancing itself from statements on the conflict in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, 3SI’s political dimension is secondary to its economic potential. The initiative’s success will ultimately depend on the realization of concrete projects, driven by its Business Forum (which brings together hundreds of business entities) and the 3SI Investment Fund. The first four investing countries were Croatia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The fund, now exceeding $1 billion, is managed by Amber Fund Management, a private financial company specializing in transport infrastructure investments—underscoring the business and market-oriented dimension of 3SI.

At first glance, 3SI may not appear overwhelmingly impressive in terms of realized results, but its strategic potential is undeniable. The capital importance of the LNG terminal on the island of Krk or the Baltic railway hardly needs further explanation.

The Joint Declaration from Warsaw specifically listed a number of strategic projects under 3SI: in addition to the LNG terminal on Krk and the Warsaw–Tallinn railway, they include the BRUA gas pipeline (connecting Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria), a rail line between Gdańsk (Poland) and Constanța (Romania), and highways connecting Prague–Tallinn and Thessaloniki–Klaipėda (a major port and container terminal in Lithuania). The war in Ukraine has only amplified the importance of these projects.

Due to the Cold War legacy, infrastructure in the 3SI area is mostly aligned along an East–West axis. The initiative could therefore help build a strategic North–South corridor, linking the Polish Baltic coast with the deep-water ports of Kvarner Bay (Rijeka and Omišalj).

Unlike the Central European and Adriatic–Ionian Initiatives, the Three Seas Initiative does not have a permanent secretariat. Instead, coordination is carried out by the country that holds the rotating one-year presidency. For the coming year, that country will be Croatia.

The idea of establishing a permanent secretariat is neither new nor particularly inventive—it is clear that it would improve coordination, summit preparation, and project planning and implementation. However, the question remains: where should such a secretariat be located? The competition is stiff, and consensus is still lacking. Some have even floated the idea of a “rotating permanent secretariat”—a concept that is anything but ideal.

Croatia could use its role as the next summit host to advocate for the secretariat to be established in one of its cities. Split or Rijeka seem like strong candidates. The benefits this would bring in terms of visibility and development for the host city can be seen in the example of the Spanish city of Vigo, which became the seat of the European Fisheries Control Agency.